Abstract. The ecological literature suggests that biodiversity reduces the variance of ecosystem services. Thus, conservative biodiversity management has an insurance value to risk-averse users of ecosystem services. We analyze a conceptual ecological-economic model in which such management measures generate a private benefit and, via ecosystem processes at higher hierarchical levels, a positive externality on other ecosystem users. We find that ecosystem management and environmental policy depend on the extent of uncertainty and risk-aversion as follows: (i) Individual effort to improve ecosystem quality unambiguously increases. The free-rider problem may decrease or increase, depending on the characteristics of the ecosystem and its management; in particular, (ii) the size of the externality may decrease or increase, depending on how individual and aggregate management effort influence biodiversity; and (iii) the welfare loss due to free-riding may decrease or increase, depending on how biodiversity influences ecosystem service provision.
Introduction
Human well-being depends in manifold ways on ecosystem services, which are understood as the various benefits provided by natural or managed ecosystems (Daily 1997 , Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005 . Examples include goods such as food, fuel or fiber; and services such as pollination or the regulation of local climate, pests, diseases or water runoff from a watershed. In a world of uncertainty, human well-being depends not only on the mean level at which such services are being provided, but also on their statistical distribution. Biodiversity can reduce the variance at which desired ecosystem services are provided. This means, biodiversity can provide insurance to risk averse users of these systems, e.g. crop, orchard or livestock farmers, or water utility managers. In this paper, we analyze how risk-averse ecosystem managers make use of this insurance function of biodiversity when management measures generate both a private benefit and, via ecosystem processes at higher hierarchical levels, positive externalities on other ecosystem users. We study the implications of uncertainty and risk-aversion for ecosystem management and environmental policy, and how these depend on ecosystem properties and processes.
The analysis is based on a conceptual ecological-economic model. Ecosystem services (e.g. pollination of orchards by insects) are random because of exogenous sources of risk (e.g. winter temperature); their statistical distribution (mean and variance) is determined by ecosystem quality (biodiversity). Ecosystem quality, in turn, can be influenced by management action (e.g. setting aside land for wetlands and hedges as habitat for insects) that affects ecosystem processes at different scales. Ecosystem users are risk-averse and choose a management action such as to maximize utility from ecosystem services (e.g. income from orchard farming).
Our modeling of biodiversity and the provision of ecosystem services captures three stylized facts about ecosystem functioning that emerged from recent theoretical, experimental and observational research in ecology (which is surveyed in Section 2):
• The mean level of ecosystem services increases with biodiversity.
• The variance of ecosystem services decreases with biodiversity.
• Local biodiversity is affected by ecosystem processes at different hierarchical scales.
These stylized ecological facts are of economic relevance. Biodiversity increasing management creates benefits in terms of a higher mean level and a reduced variance of ecosystem services. In particular, an individual manager's action affects biodiversity via ecosystem processes at different scales. At a lower scale, benefits accrue exclusively to him. At a higher scale, his action contributes to increasing local biodiversity for other users, thereby generating a positive externality. For example, by setting aside land on his farm as habitat for insects, an individual farmer increases the local level of biodiversity on his farm and also contributes -via metapopulation dynamics (Hanski 1999 , Levins 1969 ) -to biodiversity on other farms.
Our analysis of endogenous environmental risk and ecosystem management is inspired by Crocker and Shogren (1999 and Shogren and Crocker (1999) , who have developed the idea that environmental risk is endogenous, that is, economic decision makers bearing environmental risk influence their risk through their actions. They have formalized decision making under uncertainty in this context by conceptualizing ecosystems as lotteries. The role of biodiversity as a natural insurance has already been studied for the case of a single decision maker managing a private resource (Baumgärtner, 1 However, biodiversity has not only a private insurance func- 1 In this respect, biodiversity plays a similar role for farmers as other risk changing production tion, but provides public insurance benefits as well. This public-good aspect and the associated environmental policy issues have not been studied so far.
The conventional wisdom on the use (or provision) of a public good under uncertainty seems to be that the more uncertainty and the higher the risk aversion of individual decision makers, the less severe is the problem of overuse (or underprovision) of the public good (Bramoullé and in the 'technology' of public good provision. They model the production of the public good (or public bad) in a trivial way, i.e. one unit of money spent on providing the public good equals one unit of the public good provided. Sandler and Sterbenz (1990) consider the open access harvesting of a renewable resource, thus taking a more detailed look on how individual harvesting efforts cause externalities for other users of the ecosystem. Also, all these contributions study how uncertainty affects individual behavior in equilibrium, but do not explicitly address the questions of how severe is the problem of market failure in welfare terms, or how to solve this problem by suitable policy measures such as e.g. Pigouvian taxes or subsidies. In this regard, Aronsson and Blomquist (2003) study the optimal and second-best taxation of a dirty consumption good which causes a (public bad) pollution problem. They show that the optimal tax increases with uncertainty.
Against this background, our analysis makes three contributions. First, we employ a detailed and differentiated model of ecosystem functioning which captures how individual actions translate into private and public benefits. Second, we explicitly study the extent of market distortion and optimal regulation, and factors, such as e.g. nitrogen fertilizer or pesticides (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993 , 1994a , 1994b ).
how those depend on the degree of uncertainty and risk-aversion, by employing a measure of social welfare. Third, we analyze how the relationship between uncertainty and the free-rider problem depends on ecosystem properties and processes.
Our analysis thereby yields insights into how the optimal regulation of biodiversity management under uncertainty hinges upon ecosystem characteristics and, in particular, on the natural insurance function of biodiversity.
We show that with increasing uncertainty and risk-aversion the private efforts to improve ecosystem quality increase, because ecosystem managers, when choosing a management action under uncertainty, take into account biodiversity's insurance value and manage the ecosystem such as to obtain the optimal balance between high expected yield and insurance. As a consequence, the higher the uncertainty and the more risk-averse the ecosystem managers are, the higher is the resulting ecosystem quality. Thus, under uncertainty the ecosystem management is more conservative, and the resulting ecosystem quality is higher, than it would be in a world of certainty. Yet, the effect of uncertainty on the free-rider problem is ambiguous. The extent of the optimal regulatory intervention may decrease or increase with uncertainty depending on the relative effects of management measures on biodiversity via the lower ('local') and the higher ('global') scale. Other ecosystem properties determine how uncertainty influences the welfare loss due to free-riding, which also may decrease or increase with uncertainty. If biodiversity reduces the variance of ecosystem services very strongly, i.e. the ecosystem has a high natural insurance function, the welfare loss decreases with uncertainty. If, on the other hand, biodiversity reduces the variance of ecosystem services only moderately, the welfare loss increases with uncertainty. In other words, for ecosystems that have only a very weak natural insurance function, the free-rider problem increases with uncertainty.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the ecological background on ecosystem functioning and how biodiversity affects the provision of ecosystem services. In Section 3, we specify an ecological-economic model of an ecosystem which is managed for the ecosystem services that it provides. The anal-ysis and results are presented in Section 4, with all proofs and formal derivations contained in the Appendix. Section 5 concludes.
2 Ecological background: biodiversity and the provision of ecosystem services
Over the past fifteen years, there has been intensive research in ecology on the role of biodiversity for ecosystem functioning and the provision of ecosystem services.
Biodiversity has been defined as 'the variability among living organisms from all sources ... and the ecological complexes of which they are part' (CBD 1992), which encompasses a wide spectrum of biotic scales, from genetic variation within species to biome distribution on the planet (Gaston 1996 , Purvis and Hector 2000 , Wilson 1992 ). Biodiversity can be described in terms of numbers of entities (e.g. genotypes, species, or ecosystems), the evenness of their distribution, the differences in their functional traits, and their interactions. The simplest measure of biodiversity at, say, the species level is therefore simply the number of different species ('species richness'). Much of ecological research has relied on this measure when quantifying biodiversity, although more encompassing information has also been employed (Baumgärtner 2006 These three stylized facts are now briefly discussed in turn. Complementarity, facilitation and sampling effects will all lead to a saturating average impact of species richness on the level of some ecosystem service ( Figure 1A ,
Experiments have confirmed the important role of these two primary mechanisms through which biodiversity may increase the mean absolute level of certain ecosystem services. In these experiments, the responses to changing diversity are strongest at low levels of species richness and generally saturate at 5-10 species. It has also become evident that complementarity, facilitation and sampling/selection effects are all relevant and can be observed. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they may be simultaneously or sequentially at work in one system.
These theoretical and experimental findings need to be qualified in a number of respects:
• The exact response of ecosystem services on changes in biodiversity is determined at least as much by differences in species composition, i.e. which species and functional traits are lost and remain behind, as by species richness, i.e. how many species are lost.
• Patterns of response to experimental manipulation of species richness vary for different ecosystem processes and services, different ecosystems, and even different compartments within ecosystems.
• Varying the diversity and composition of an ecological community at more than one trophic level can lead to more idiosyncratic behavior than varying diversity of primary producers alone.
• The different patterns identified may or may not reflect actual patterns seen for a particular ecosystem under a particular scenario of species loss or invasion, which will depend not only on the functional traits of the species involved, but also on the exact pattern of environmental change and the species traits that determine how species respond to these changes.
Biodiversity may reduce the variance of ecosystem services
Ecological theory, both via simple reasoning and via mathematical models, has lead to the understanding that a diversity of species with different sensitivities to a suite of environmental conditions should lead to greater stability of ecosystem properties. The basic idea is that with increasing number of functionally different species, the probability increases that some of these species can react in a functionally differentiated manner to external disturbance of the system and changing environmental conditions. In addition, the probability increases that some species are functionally redundant, such that one species can take over the role of another species when the latter goes extinct. This is what ecologists have been calling an 'insurance effect' of biodiversity in carrying out ecological processes (e.g. Yachi and Loreau 1999). With this logic, the number of species or functional traits necessary to maintain ecosystem processes under changing environmental conditions increases with spatial and temporal scales.
Several mathematical models generally support these hypotheses and highlight the role of statistical averaging -the so-called 'portfolio effect' -for the result:
if species abundances are negatively correlated or vary randomly and independently from one another, then overall ecosystem properties are likely to vary less in more diverse communities than in species-poor communities. 4 The strength of the modeled effects of diversity depends on many parameters, including the degree of correlation among different species' responses, the evenness of distribution among species' abundances, and the extent to which the variability in abundances scales with the mean.
While theory is well developed, controlled experiments are very difficult to carry out, because one needs to make sure that the effect of species diversity is not confounded by other variables, such as e.g. soil fertility or disturbance regime.
Nevertheless, considerable evidence exists from experimental studies in a variety of ecosystems that increasing species diversity can increase the stability of ecosystem processes and services in response to changing environmental conditions and species loss. As an example, Figure 2 shows experimental results for aboveground plant biomass production in response to climatic variability in a Minnesota grassland ( Figure 2A ), and net ecosystem CO 2 flux in a microbial microcosm (Figure 2B ). However, results of these experiments may be confounded by a variety of variables other than species richness or diversity, which has raised considerable controversy over the interpretation of these results. And while species richness or the Shannon-Wiener-index of species diversity was statistically significant in all these experiments, species composition (where investigated) had an at least equally strong effect on stability. Also, while the overall stability patterns found are as predicted from theory, the experiments so far give little insights about the underlying basic mechanisms.
Local biodiversity is influenced by ecosystem processes
at different hierarchical scales The hierarchical structure of ecosystems constitutes a particular challenge for ecosystem management, since it is necessary to adapt the scales at which management operates to the relevant scales of the ecosystem (Levin 2000 , Peterson et al. 1998 ). In our model, we capture this by identifying the management ac-tions affecting processes at the higher hierarchical level with the aggregate action of ecosystem managers, while the individual management actions influence the ecosystem processes at the lower hierarchical level.
Ecological-economic model
We consider an ecosystem which is managed for some ecosystem service that it provides. Due to stochastic fluctuations in environmental conditions the provision of the ecosystem service is uncertain. Its statistical distribution depends on the state of the ecosystem in terms of biodiversity ('ecosystem quality'), which is influenced by how the system is being managed. As a result, the statistical distribution of ecosystem service and, hence, of income from ecosystem use depend on ecosystem management. We capture these relationships in a stylized ecological-economic model as follows.
Ecosystem management
There are n ecosystem managers, numbered by i = 1, . . . , n. Each ecosystem manager can choose a level x i of individual effort to improve ecosystem quality.
The level of ecosystem quality q i is specific to user i. It increases with user i's individual effort x i and aggregate effort X:
where
and subscripts x and X denote partial derivatives with respect to x i and X respectively. We assume that q x > 0 if q X = 0 and that q X > 0 if q x = 0 (otherwise results are trivial), and that q is concave. All individuals face the same type of ecosystem, so that the function q(·, ·) has no index i.
Assumption (1) expresses the idea that the level of ecosystem quality relevant to user i is determined by both the individual management action x i taken by user i and positive externalities from the aggregate effort X of all ecosystem managers.
How the function q i depends on x i and X reflects the hierarchical structure of the ecosystem (cf. Section 2.3): it captures how individual effort x i affects local ecological processes, how aggregate effort X affects ecological processes at a higher scale, and how these processes interact to determine local ecosystem quality. In the extreme, q x > 0 and q X ≡ 0 corresponds to a situation where only local ecological processes are relevant and therefore management effort is purely private with no spill-overs to others. The other extreme, q x ≡ 0 and q X > 0, corresponds to a situation where local ecosystem quality is completely determined by higher-scale ecological processes, such that management effort is a pure public good.
Given ecosystem quality q i , the ecosystem provides user i with the ecosystem service at level s i which is a random variable. Its statistical distribution depends on ecosystem quality q i . Full ecological information about this relationship is hardly available. As discussed in Section 2, however, there is reliable evidence on how ecosystem quality influences the fist two moments of the statistical distribution. We therefore build our analysis upon the mean, Es i , and variance, var s i , of ecosystem service, which depend on ecosystem quality q i :
where E is the expectancy operator. An increase in the parameter θ > 0 models a mean-preserving spread of risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) . This allows us to discuss the effects of increased uncertainty in a convenient way. Again, since all individuals face the same type of ecosystem, the probability distribution of the ecosystem service is the same for all users who have the same ecosystem quality q. In accordance with ecological evidence (cf. Sections 2.1 and 2.2), the functions µ and σ 2 are assumed to have the following properties:
where the prime denotes a derivative. For each user, the mean level of ecosystem service provision increases, and its variance decreases, with ecosystem quality q.
Both effects decrease in magnitude with the level of ecosystem quality.
Income
Improving ecosystem quality carries costs, which are purely private and are described by the cost function
Balancing the benefits from ecosystem services and the costs of ecosystem management, manager i's net income from ecosystem use is
where we have assumed that the ecosystem service directly translates into monetary income. Since the ecosystem service s i is a random variable, net income y i is a random variable, too. With the mean Es i = µ (q(x i , X)) and variance
) of ecosystem service (Equations 3 and 1), the mean Ey i and variance var y i of the manager's income y i are:
var
That is, the mean income is given by the mean ecosystem service minus the costs of managing ecosystem quality; the variance of income equals the variance of ecosystem service.
Preferences
All ecosystem managers are assumed to have identical preferences over their uncertain income y i , and to be risk-averse. 5 As discussed above, we only have ecological information about the mean and variance of ecosystem service, and, thus, of income. This restricts the class of risk preferences which can meaningfully be represented in our ecological-economic model to utility functions which depend only on the mean and variance of income. Specifically, we assume the following expected utility function, where ρ > 0 is a parameter describing the manager's degree of risk aversion (Arrow 1965 , Pratt 1964 ):
4 Analysis and results which is defined as the amount of money that leaves the decision maker equally well off, in terms of utility, between the two situations of (i) receiving for sure the expected pay-off from the lottery Ey minus the risk premium R, and (ii) playing the risky lottery with random pay-off y (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal 1979: 381, Kreps 1990: 84). With utility function (9), the risk premium R of a lottery with mean pay-off Ey and variance var y is simply given by:
In general, the idea of an insurance is that it reduces the (income) risk to which one is exposed. In the extreme, under full insurance one does not have any income risk at all. For the sake of our analysis, we conceptualize this notion of insurance by employing the risk premium as a measure of riskiness. A change in the action x such that, as a result, the risk premium R is reduced, therefore has an insurance value equal to
This insurance value captures (i) the ecosystem manager's subjective valuation of risk, measured by the degree of absolute risk-aversion ρ; (ii) the ecosystem's response, in terms of reduced variance of ecosystem service provision, to an increased quality, given by the factor σ 2 ; and (iii) how ecosystem quality improves due to both individual and the aggregate management efforts (the 'technology' of ecosystem management), given by the factor q x + q X . Note that (i) captures a subjective aspect, while (ii) and (iii) capture objective aspects of the insurance value.
Laissez-faire equilibrium
As laissez-faire equilibrium, we consider the allocation which results as Nashequilibrium without regulating intervention. Each ecosystem manager's decision problem is to maximize his expected utility, taking the actions of all other ecosys-tem managers as given. Formally, manager i's decision problem is
where X = x 1 + . . . + x n and all x j for j = i are treated as given. We assume (throughout the remainder of this paper) that an interior solution exists.
7

Lemma 1
The laissez-faire equilibrium has the following properties: (i) it is unique, (ii) it is symmetric, i.e. all ecosystem managers choose the same level of ecosystem management, x i = x for all i = 1, . . . , n, and (iii) it is characterized by the
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
While the right hand side of Condition (13) captures the marginal costs of the effort to improve ecosystem quality, the left hand side contains its marginal benefits. They comprise two additive components: the marginal gain in the mean level of ecosystem service and the insurance value of improving ecosystem quality, i.e. the marginal reduction of the manager's risk-premium due to a marginal increase in his individual management effort (cf. Section 4.1). Hence, the insurance value is a value component in addition to the value arguments which hold in a world of certainty. It leads to choosing a higher level of management effort than without taking the insurance value into account. How the equilibrium level of ecosystem management effort depends on the degree of uncertainty and on the managers' risk aversion mainly depends on the properties of the insurance value.
7 Ecosystem properties (1) and (4) and the cost function (5) do not exclude corner solutions.
For instance, for very high marginal costs and low marginal benefits of management effort, the Nash equilibrium may be not to make any effort at all. On the other hand, for low marginal costs, the equilibrium could be to make the maximum possible effort, because ecosystem quality has the double benefit of increasing the mean and reducing the variance of ecosystem service provision.
Proposition 1
1. The equilibrium levels x of ecosystem management effort and q of ecosystem quality increase with uncertainty:
2. The equilibrium levels x of ecosystem management effort and q of ecosystem quality increase with the ecosystem managers' degree ρ of risk aversion:
Proof: see Appendix A.2.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. Since the individuals are riskaverse, the risk-premium increases if either the degree of risk-aversion or the uncertainty as such increase. As a consequence, the insurance value of improving ecosystem quality increases. The resulting higher marginal utility leads to a higher equilibrium level of management effort x and to improved ecosystem quality q . 
Efficient allocation
The next step is to derive the efficient allocation. Since we are interested in comparing the efficient allocation to the laissez-faire equilibrium, we will concentrate on the symmetric Pareto-optimum in which all ecosystem managers make the same effort. 8 To derive this allocation we define social welfare as the sum of the utilities of all n ecosystem managers:
The efficient allocation is derived by choosing the individual levels of management effort, such that social welfare (16) is maximized subject to the constraints (7) and (8),
An interior solution to this problem exists and is characterized as follows.
Lemma 2
The efficient allocation has the following properties: (i) it is unique, (ii) all ecosystem managers make the same management effortx, and (iii) it is characterized by the condition
Proof: see Appendix A.4.
Like in the laissez-faire equilibrium, the insurance value of improving ecosystem quality plays an important role. The efficient insurance value in Condition (18) consists of similar components as the insurance value considered by the individual ecosystem managers in equilibrium (Condition 13), but the contribution of the aggregate effort on ecosystem quality is augmented by a factor n. Because the positive externalities of individual management effort on the other ecosystem users' risk premium are taken into account, the efficient insurance value is greater than the equilibrium insurance value. Similarly, the marginal benefits with respect to the mean level of ecosystem service provision are higher in the efficient allocation.
This implies that the efficient levelx of individual management effort is greater 8 Conditions for a general Pareto-optimum are derived in Appendix A.3.
than the equilibrium level x , and the efficient levelq of ecosystem quality is greater than the equilibrium level q . The efficient allocation has the following properties.
Proposition 2
1. The efficient levelsx of ecosystem management effort andq of ecosystem quality increase with uncertainty:
2. The efficient levelsx of ecosystem management effort andq of ecosystem quality increase with the ecosystem managers' degree ρ of risk aversion:
Proof: see Appendix A.5.
The intuition behind the result is as follows. An increase in the uncertainty or in the degree of the ecosystem managers' risk-aversion increases the efficient insurance value of ecosystem management effort. Hence, the marginal benefits of management effort increase, leading to a higher efficient levelx of effort. As a consequence, ecosystem qualityq increases. The effects go in the same direction as in the laissez-faire equilibrium. However, they differ in their quantitative extent because the positive externalities are taken into account.
Environmental policy
Due to the external effects of individual ecosystem management effort, the laissezfaire equilibrium is not efficient. In equilibrium, ecosystem managers will spend too little effort to improve ecosystem quality, because they do not take into consideration the positive externality on other ecosystem users. In order to implement the efficient allocation as an equilibrium, a regulator could impose a Pigouvian subsidy on individual management effort. Denoting the subsidy per unit x i with τ , the optimization problem of ecosystem manager i then reads
Comparing the first order conditions for the efficient allocation (Equation 18) and for the regulated equilibrium (i.e. the first order condition of maximizing (21) with respect to x i ), we obtain the optimal subsidyτ .
Lemma 3
The efficient allocation is implemented as an equilibrium, if a subsidyτ on individual ecosystem management effort is set witĥ
Clearly, the optimal subsidy increases with q X (x, nx), i.e. it is higher, the higher is the marginal benefit of aggregate effort in terms of ecosystem quality improvement. There are two contributions to the optimal subsidy rate, which are captured by the two terms in brackets. In the case of risk-neutrality, ρ = 0, only the first term in brackets remains. Then, the optimal subsidy is (n − 1) q X µ , that is, it just internalizes the positive externality that an increase in individual management effort has on the expected payoff of the n − 1 other ecosystem managers.
For ρ > 0, the second term in brackets captures the positive externality of an individual ecosystem manager's contribution to ecosystem quality which is due to the insurance value that the higher ecosystem quality has for the n − 1 remaining ecosystem managers.
The optimal subsidyτ can be interpreted as a measure of the size of the externality that gives rise to the public good problem. It has become clear from the discussion so far that the public good problem depends on the degree of uncertainty and of the ecosystem managers' risk-aversion. The questions are whether more or less regulation is required if (i) the uncertainty of ecosystem services or
(ii) the degree of risk-aversion increase.
Proposition 3
The optimal subsidy decreases/is unchanged/increases with uncertainty and with the degree ρ of risk-aversion, i.e. dτ dθ
if and only if
is the marginal rate of substitution between individual and aggregate management effort's impact on local ecosystem quality.
Proof: see Appendix A.6.
Although both increased uncertainty and increased risk-aversion have an unambiguously positive effect on the individual level of management effort to improve ecosystem quality (Proposition 1), the effect on the optimal regulation can go either way, depending on the 'technology' and the costs of ecosystem management as specified by Condition (24).
The first factor on the left hand side of Condition (24) (24) is the elasticity of marginal costs. The following example may illustrate the meaning of Condition (24) . Suppose
This specification may be interpreted as follows: individual and aggregate management effort, x and X, determine local biodiversity q via a CES-production function 
If individual and aggregate management effort are complements, ζ < 0, the Pigouvian subsidy decreases with uncertainty or risk-aversion if β > α, i.e., if the percentage increase of biodiversity from an increase in aggregate management effort is higher than from an increase in individual management effort. That is, with increasing management effort aggregate management effort becomes less of a limiting factor for local ecosystem quality and, hence, the size of the externality decreases.
If, on the other hand, individual and aggregate management effort are substitutes, ζ > 0, the Pigouvian subsidy decreases with uncertainty or risk-aversion if α > β.
That is, with increasing management effort individual management effort more and more substitutes aggregate effort and, hence, the size of the externality decreases. In the limiting case ζ = 0, both effects equal out: the Pigouvian subsidy is independent of the degree of uncertainty or risk-aversion.
Although the Pigouvian subsidy is an appropriate monetary measure of the extent of regulation necessary to reach the efficient allocation in a decentralized economy, a different measure is required in order to determine the welfare loss due to the external effects. This welfare loss is the difference in welfare between the efficient allocation and the laissez-faire allocation. Employing the welfare function (16), it is given bŷ
Proposition 4
The welfare loss due to free-riding decreases/is unchanged/increases with uncer-
Proof: This is proved by differentiating Equation (28) with respect to θ, using the envelope theorem, dŴ /dθ = ∂Ŵ /∂θ, and the equilibrium condition (13). 2
Whether the welfare loss due to free-riding decreases or increases with uncertainty depends on the relative magnitude of two effects: on the one hand, the absolute difference in income risk between the laissez-faire equilibrium and the efficient allocation increases with increasing uncertainty. Therefore, the term on the left hand side in Condition (30) The net effect of increased uncertainty on the welfare loss due to the externality is ambiguous. In the following, we will demonstrate that whether the welfare loss decreases or increases depends, inter alia, on the ecosystem's properties. For this purpose, consider again the example of a CES-management technology (Equation 26). For simplicity, let ζ = 0 and α = β = 1. In this case, the specification (26) becomes
and assume constant marginal costs of management effort, c(x) = c x. This is exactly the borderline case in terms of Condition (24), i.e., the Pigouvian subsidyτ is independent of θ and ρ.
In order to focus on the insurance effect we disregard that improved ecosystem quality increases the mean level of ecosystem services, i.e. µ(q) = µ = constant.
Finally, assume that the variance of ecosystem services depends on ecosystem quality as follows
where η > 0 and < 1. This is not possible for < 0.
Whether the welfare losses due to the public good problem decreases, is un- The case > 0 corresponds to an ecosystem with very high natural insurance function in the following sense: an increase of ecosystem quality strongly reduces the variance of ecosystem service provision and can, eventually, completely remove the variance. In this case, increasing uncertainty reduces the welfare loss due to free-riding. 11 In the case = 0, uncertainty plays no role for the extent of welfare loss. For low natural insurance function, < 0, the effect that the difference in variance between the efficient allocation and the laissez-faire equilibrium increases with uncertainty outweighs the welfare-increasing effect of increased individual 10 In the case = 0, the specification (33) becomes σ 2 (q) = exp(−q/η).
11 However, even if > 0 uncertainty does not necessarily increase welfare: in the efficient allocation, uncertainty unambiguously reduces welfare of risk-averse individuals; in the laissezfaire equilibrium, welfare can, in principle, increase with uncertainty. In our example, this is the
, which is a stronger assumption than > 0. management effort. In that case, uncertainty increases the welfare loss due to free-riding.
Conclusions
We have analyzed how risk-averse ecosystem users manage an ecosystem for its services. The ecosystem model captures three stylized facts, as identified in the ecological literature: (i) the mean level of ecosystem services increases with biodiversity; (ii) the variance of ecosystem services decreases with biodiversity; (iii) biodiversity is influenced by ecosystem processes operating at different hierarchical scales. We have considered two such scales: individual management action affects processes at the lower scale, while aggregate action affects processes at the higher scale. Thus, individual management action has not only a private benefit, but also a positive externality on other ecosystem users.
We have demonstrated that conservative biodiversity management has a private and public insurance value, which depends on the ecosystem managers' riskaversion and on ecosystem properties. Because ecosystem managers take into account the ecosystem's insurance value when choosing a management action under uncertainty, the level of individual effort to improve ecosystem quality increases with increasing uncertainty and risk-aversion. As a consequence, higher uncertainty and higher risk-aversion lead to a higher level of biodiversity. Thus, under uncertainty the ecosystem management is more conservative, and the resulting level of biodiversity is higher, than it would be in a world of certainty.
Due to the external effect of individual management effort, the laissez-faire equilibrium is not efficient. In order to study how the public good-problem is affected by uncertainty, we have analyzed how (i) the extent of regulation necessary to implement the efficient allocation and (ii) the welfare loss due to free-riding depend on the degree of uncertainty and on ecosystem properties. The first order condition of Problem (12) is
We denote byX the aggregate effort of all ecosystem managers except for manager i, i.e.X = X − x i . Hence, we can write
We prove the lemma in three steps: (i) we prove that a solution x to (13) is unique, (ii) we prove that x i = x for all i = 1, . . . , n is a Nash-equilibrium. This is done by showing that x i = x solves (A.2), ifX = (n − 1) x . And (iii) we prove that no asymmetric Nash-equilibrium exists.
Ad (i).
A solution x of (13) is unique, because, by assumption (5), the right hand side c (x ) is increasing with x , while the left hand side is decreasing with x ;
where we omitted arguments for the sake of a clearer exposition. The sign of this expression is negative by assumptions (1) and (4).
Ad (ii). To show that the symmetric allocation x i = x for all i = 1, . . . , n is a Nash equilibrium, we assumeX = (n − 1) x is given for manager i. In this case, the optimal effort for manager i is x , because x i = x solves Condition (13) uniquely. By symmetry, x i = x for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Ad (iii). Consider the two cases (i)X > (n − 1) x and (ii)X < (n − 1) x . In case (i), the optimal effort for manager i is x i < x . To prove this, we differentiate Condition (A.2) w.r.t.X, which yields
which is negative by assumptions (1) and (4) . Since x i = x forX = (n − 1) x ,
Due to the symmetry, this contradicts the assumptioñ X > (n − 1) x , since all ecosystem managers would choose x i < x . Hence, there is no equilibrium whereX > (n − 1) x . With a similar argument, we can rule out case (ii). Hence, x i = x for all i = 1, . . . , n is the unique equilibrium.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Ad 1. Differentiating Condition (13) with respect to θ yields:
Rearranging, and using the equilibrium condition (13), we have
Because the term in brackets is negative (by Assumptions (1), (4) and (5)), we conclude dx /dθ > 0. dq /dθ > 0 follows, because
Ad 2. Differentiating (13) with respect to ρ yields (omitting arguments):
[q xx + (n + 1) q xX + n q XX ] − c dx dρ
The same arguments as in Part 1 of the proof lead to the conclusion dx /dρ > 0 and dq /dρ > 0.
A.3 Pareto-efficient allocations
We consider the social planner's problem max x 1 ,...,xn
Eu(y 1 ) s.t. (1), (2), (4), (7), (8), and Eu(y i ) ≥ U i ∀ i = 1.
The Lagrangian for this problem reads
where λ 1 = 1. The first order conditions of this problem read for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
λ k µ (q(x k ,X)) − ρ 2 θ σ 2 (q(x k ,X)) q X (x k ,X) . (A.9)
Dividing the i-th equation by the first one yields:
θ σ 2 (q(x 1 ,X)) q x (x 1 ,X) µ (q(x i ,X)) q x (x i ,X) − c (x i ) − ρ 2 θ σ 2 (q(x i ,X)) q x (x i ,X) . Since the denominator of this expression is negative and the first two factors of the numerator together are negative, too, the change ofτ following an increase in θ has the same sign as
Using this in Equation (
[−q X q xx − n q X q xX + n q x q XX + q x q xX ] + q X c . (A. 22) Rearranging, this expression has the same sign as
which is equal to, using the efficiency condition (18), − q xx + n q xX q x − q xX + n q XX q X c q x q x + n q X + c .
(A.24)
Using the abbreviation (25) and rearranging leads to Condition (24). 
A.7 Proof of Result on page 27
With the specifications (32), c(x) = c · x, and µ(q) = µ, we have (using A.6) A Taylor-series expansion-argument yields the result that the expression in brackets is negative for > 0, zero for = 0 and positive for 0 < < 1.
